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TENDING TO POTTED PLANTS:
THE PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY VACUUM
IN GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS
Jeffrey W. Stempel*
As people my age probably recall, Washington lawyer Brendan Sullivan1
briefly became a celebrity when defending former Reagan White House aide
Oliver North before a Senate investigation. Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-Haw.)
was questioning Colonel North when Sullivan objected. “Let the witness
object, if he wishes to,” responded Senator Inouye, to which Sullivan famously
replied, “Well, sir, I’m not a potted plant. I’m here as the lawyer. That’s my
job.”2
The episode was captured on live television and rebroadcast repeatedly,
making Sullivan something of a hero to lawyers,3 even moderates and liberals
* Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Bill Boyd, Doris Lee, Ted Lee, Ann McGinley,
Jim Rogers, and John White. Special thanks to David McClure, Jeanne Price, Elizabeth
Ellison, Chandler Pohl, and Kathleen Wilde for valuable research assistance. © 2011 Jeffrey
W. Stempel
1 Sullivan was a partner in the Washington, D.C. firm Williams & Connolly, a firm with a
sophisticated practice and prestigious reputation, particularly in the area of white-collar
criminal defense. See Brendan V. Sullivan Jr., Partner, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, http://
www.wc.com/bsullivan (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). Founding partner Edward Bennett Wil-
liams is perhaps best known as a lawyer for his successful defense of Teamster’s Union head
Jimmy Hoffa as well as defense of other public figures charged with crimes or corruption.
See Firm Overview, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, http://www.wc.com/about.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 9, 2012).
2 See KIM EISLER, MASTERS OF THE GAME: INSIDE THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL LAW
FIRM 141 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE
IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP 133 (1997) [hereinafter WALSH, FIREWALL]; see
also John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 282–86 (1989) (describ-
ing Sullivan’s handling of another verbal “altercation” between Sullivan and Chief Senate
Counsel Arthur L. Liman during the Iran-Contra hearings).
3 See EISLER, supra note 2, at 141 (“With that line, Sullivan vaulted from the case files in
the law library into the reference pages of Bartlett’s Quotations. . . . Sullivan immediately
and unexpectedly became one of the most recognizable attorney names in the world.”); OLI-
VER L. NORTH WITH WILLIAM NOVAK, UNDER FIRE: AN AMERICAN STORY 363 (1991)
(“Who could have guessed that a throwaway line about foliage would capture the imagina-
tion of the American public? That afternoon, we returned to the law firm to find dozens of
potted plants. By the next day, there were potted plants everywhere—in the lobby, in the
corridors, and especially in Brendan’s office, which . . . resembled a terrarium.”); Aaron
Epstein, Ollie North’s Mouthpiece Lawyer Brendan V. Sullivan Jr. Played The Heavy In the
1987 Iran-contra Hearings. These Days, He’s Using A Different Strategy. Still, You’ll Never
Confuse Him With A Potted Plant, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 24, 1989, http://articles.philly.
com/1989-03-24/news/26128966_1_north-trial-brendan-sullivan-s-iran-contra (“With a sin-
gle phrase, the man by North’s side burst into public attention as a lawyer who couldn’t be
cowed.”). Of course, as well-put by the photographer Weegee, “You’re as good as your last
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who had little use of Colonel North’s conservative politics and the Iran-Contra
scheme that funded anti-communist guerillas in Central America through the
proceeds of weapon sales to Iran.4 Whatever the merits or demerits of Colonel
North as a client (seen by some as a patriot, others as a criminal or even a
traitor),5 people instinctively realized that persons facing congressional investi-
gation/inquisition were entitled to competent, even combative counsel.
Although Sullivan’s potted plant remark did not quite reach the level of
Joseph Welch’s “Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you left
no sense of decency?” that helped to wake the nation from the fog of
McCarthyism,6 it was a good example of a lawyer doing his job, protecting his
client, willing to confront power without backing down, and using some humor
to boot. History and literature are festooned with similar examples of lawyers
taking a stand for their clients and justice in the face of mob insanity and gov-
ernment oppression: Lord Brougham,7 Thomas More,8 Andrew Hamilton,9
picture. One day you’re a hero, the next day you’re a bum.” Jan Morris, New York’s Golden
Age: ‘Manhattan ‘45’, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 6, 1986, at 48, 56 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The American Lawyer described Attorney Sullivan’s less successful outing represent-
ing a product manufacturer in tort litigation a few months after the North hearing but noted
that prospective jurors recognized him favorably as “Ollie North’s lawyer.” See Tim
O’Brien, Brendan Sullivan Bombs in Brooklyn, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 1988, at 119, reprinted
in STEVEN BRILL, TRIAL BY JURY 181 (1989).
4 See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CONTRA: THE FINAL REPORT xiii (1994) [hereinafter
WALSH, FINAL REPORT] . According to the Independent Counsel’s report:
The Iran/contra affair concerned two secret Reagan Administration policies whose operations
were coordinated by National Security Council staff. The Iran operation involved efforts in 1985
and 1986 to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East through the sale of
U.S. weapons to Iran, despite an embargo on such sales. The contra operations from 1984
through most of 1986 involved the secret governmental support of contra military and paramili-
tary activities in Nicaragua, despite congressional prohibition of this support.
The Iran and contra operations were merged when funds generated from the sale of weap-
ons to Iran were diverted to support the contra effort in Nicaragua.
Id. at xv.
5 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), modified in part, United States
v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (overturning conviction of North on the basis of
immunity granted in return for his congressional testimony). Compare WALSH, FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 105–22 (1994) (Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh’s report
describing the prosecution of Oliver North), with WALSH, FIREWALL, supra note 2, at 133
(“[T]he marine and his image had achieved overwhelming popularity. North’s military bear-
ing, the look of sincere conviction in his frequently moist gray eyes, the apparent candor of
his admissions—all these factors and more—evoked a near tidal wave of public support.”).
6 See Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges Involving: Secretary of
the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G. Adams, H. Struve Hensel and Senator Joe McCarthy,
Roy M. Cohn, and Francis P. Carr: Hearing Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations
of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 83d Cong. 2429 (1954) (statement of Joseph N. Welch,
special counsel for the Army); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Age of
McCarthy: A Cautionary Tale, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1402 (“It was the moment that finally
and indelibly exposed Joseph McCarthy for what he was: a bully willing to tear apart anyone
who tried to stop his crusade. In the weeks after the hearings, his popularity plummeted.”
(footnotes omitted)).
7 Lord Henry Brougham was a prominent English barrister probably best known for his
defense of Queen Caroline on charges of adultery, during which he famously stated that “an
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person
is his client” and that in representing the client a lawyer must disregard the interests of third
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Clarence Darrow,10 Atticus Finch,11 most of the legal cast of Law & Order,
most of the time. All resonate as lawyers trying to achieve justice while uphold-
ing the rules of the game, which guarantee rights to even the unjust. Notwith-
standing the modern spoliation of the brand by the likes of Kobayashi,12 Arnie
Becker,13 Denny Crane,14 or (most recently and God-awfully) Franklin &
persons and social institutions even if in arguing for his client it should be “his unhappy fate
to involve his country in confusion.” See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 23–24 (2009) (quoting Brougham from the TRIAL OF QUEEN
CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821)); see also JANE ROBINS, THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CARO-
LINE (2006).
The episode is usually invoked to illustrate Brougham’s willingness to take on the
crown and attack the King’s own conduct as necessary. It was also probably blackmail of
sorts suggesting that if the King wanted to question the Queen’s fidelity, his own and the
state of the royal union generally would also be examined by Brougham at a public trial. But
in any event, Brougham’s dictum about a lawyer having absolute loyalty to clients even in
the face of powerful adverse forces has become part of the legal profession’s self-image.
8 Thomas More was the Lord Chancellor of England and defied King Henry VIII when the
King sought to obtain an invalid annulment, an expression of integrity that cost More his
life. The story was immortalized in Robert Bolt’s popular play, A Man for All Seasons in
which More famously upbraids another who would “cut down every law in England” to
defeat the Devil, to which More notes that if laws are “cut down” there will be nothing to
protect society from moments of madness “in the winds that would blow then.” ROBERT
BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (Vintage Int’l 1990).
9 Andrew Hamilton was a Philadelphia lawyer who successfully defended newspaperman
John Peter Zenger when Zenger was accused of publishing “seditious” matter critical of the
Crown, a case that is regarded as a great victory for freedom of the press and a precursor to
the First Amendment. See Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., Andrew Hamilton, in THE YALE BIOGRAPH-
ICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 246 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009); JAMES ALEXAN-
DER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE
NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972).
10 Clarence Darrow was a prominent early Twentieth Century lawyer who represented a
variety of unpopular defendants, often successfully. He is perhaps best known as the model
for the character Henry Drummond, who defended a Tennessee science teacher prosecuted
for teaching evolution in violation of a state law. See JEROME LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE,
INHERIT THE WIND: THE POWERFUL DRAMA OF THE GREATEST COURTROOM CLASH OF THE
CENTURY (1955). The play is based on the actual trial in which Darrow represented actual
school teacher Richard Scopes in what is commonly referred to as the “Scopes Monkey
Trial.”
11 Atticus Finch is the fictional hero of Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird, a novel in
which small town attorney Finch defends a poor black man falsely accused of rape. The
Finch stereotype of a courageous lawyer willing to represent unpopular (but innocent) clients
is ubiquitous among lawyers. See MIKE PAPANTONIO, IN SEARCH OF ATTICUS FINCH (1996)
(modern lawyer invokes Finch as archetype of lawyer professionalism). More critical
reviews of Lee’s book have questioned the pedestal on which Finch is placed, arguing that it
simply reflects a more genteel version of a blameworthy class structure based on racism. But
perception is reality. Even if Lee’s version of a liberal crusader seems like too establish-
mentarian to some modern readers, Finch—or at least the perception of Finch as a lawyer
who stands up for principles even in the face of social condemnation and mob psychology—
is enshrined in American legal lore.
12 Kobayashi (first name never revealed), played marvelously by the late Pete Postlethwaite,
was attorney to Kevin Spacey’s ruthlessly homicidal Keyser Soze in THE USUAL SUSPECTS
(MGM Studios 1995) and arranged elimination of Keyser’s enemies as well as bailing the
deceptively diminutive Keyser out of jail.
13 Arnie Becker, portrayed by Corbin Bernsen, was a matrimonial lawyer in the fictitious
LA Law (20th Century Fox Television 1986–94) television series. Becker regularly lied,
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Bash,15 the image remains resilient even if lawyers as a group are often the
object of jokes regarding their alleged aggression or avarice.
The noble view of the attorney in action, despite being overly romanti-
cized at times, resonates because at least the more learned elements of society
understand that this aspect of lawyering plays a vital role in social functioning.
Sure, lawyers are good to have for drawing wills, memorializing contracts,
incorporating entities, and similar work of a transaction catalyst (not to mention
good fodder for jokes and the occasional television series). But they are per-
haps even more important for providing a full and fair hearing, even to those
with whom we disagree.16
The model of the lawyer as champion for the client is well-known. Less
fully appreciated but equally important is the model of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and a faithful and fair steward of public and private power.
Although the lawyer-as-whistleblower genre gets less attention and respect than
the lawyer-as-champion model, lawyers protecting the integrity of the legal,
political, and social system have played a vital role as well. Thomas More
opposed the King’s effort to obtain the convenience of an illegal divorce.17
Elliot Richardson and William Ruckelshaus refused President Richard Nixon’s
command to fire Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox.18 Leonard Gar-
ment prevented the destruction of tape recordings of Oval Office conversations
in the Nixon White House.19 Roger Tuttle exposed the fraud on the court by
cheated and otherwise violated the rules of lawyer professional conduct (e.g., becoming sex-
ually involved with clients or opponents).
14 Denny Crane, played by Priceline pitchman and former Star Trek commander William
Shatner, was a lawyer in the television series Boston Legal (20th Century Fox Television
2004–08) in which Crane regularly dispensed with the niceties of legal ethics.
15 Franklin & Bash (Fan Fare Productions, Four Sycamore, & Left Coast Productions
2010), a cable television series that commenced in June 2011 is a particularly juvenile and
poorly done version of the “macho lawyer as party animal” legal series reflected in substan-
tial portions of programs such as Boston Legal, LA Law, and The Practice.
16 Full disclosure: I am among those with a rather negative view of Colonel North. I cannot
even make it through one of his introductions to War Stories, his television show on the Fox
News network—but like everyone else, he is entitled to a competent lawyer able to object to
perceived improper questions. Sullivan was right to act like a loyal attorney in the face of
questioning, despite the lack of merit of some of his objections (e.g. suggesting that briefing
book used by North to present his testimony was immune from production due to attorney-
client privilege).
17 The divorce the King sought was illegal, of course, because of the Canon Law of the
Roman Catholic Church, which explains why Thomas More is a saint to Roman Catholics as
well as an archetypical courageous lawyer/hero to others, even those quite in disagreement
with the Church’s historical and theological views about marriage and divorce.
18 See KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 354–58 (1997). After
Richardson and Ruckelshaus refused to fire Cox, then-Solicitor General Robert Bork did, an
action he described as averting a constitutional crisis but which was widely criticized. It
came back to haunt Bork nearly 15 years later when Bork’s nomination to the Supreme
Court was rejected by the U.S. Senate, in significant part because of Bork’s actions. See id.
at 418–22 (describing discussions of Bork’s firing of Cox during the Senate confirmation
hearings); ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 94 (1989) (describing Senator Ted Kennedy’s call to Cox to gauge his interest in
participating in the Bork confirmation battle).
19 See GILLERS, supra note 7, at 457–61 (describing consideration by Nixon Administration
of destroying tapes and White House Counsel Leonard Garment’s advice, contrary to that of
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Dalkon Shield manufacturer A.H. Robins.20 Frederick Aiken was willing to
defend the very unpopular Mary Surratt, who sheltered Lincoln assassin John
Wilkes Booth in her boarding house and was accused of being part of the assas-
sination conspiracy.21
Richard Ceballos may or may not have been a small bore Thomas More.
We’ll never know for certain because the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that his
employer, Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti, was free to fire Assistant
District Attorney Ceballos without question in alleged retaliation for Ceballos
calling the DA’s office into account for alleged use of a falsified affidavit
designed to obtain an improper conviction.22
some on the Nixon team, that destruction of the tapes would be criminal because they were
certain to be sought as evidence); see also LEONARD GARMENT, CRAZY RHYTHM 280–83
(1997) (autobiographical discussion of the episode).
20 Tuttle had been an in-house lawyer at A.H. Robins during the time of the Dalkon Shield’s
development and the early years of litigation before subsequently becoming a law professor
at Oral Roberts University. He described his role in destroying incriminating Robins’ docu-
ments, paving the way for increased success of plaintiffs’ claims. See Charles Alexander et
al., Robins Runs for Shelter, TIME, Sept. 2, 1985, www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,959
726,00.html (“Roger Tuttle, a former attorney for the company, testified that he had
destroyed internal documents relating to the Dalkon Shield on orders from his bosses. Rob-
ins flatly denied Tuttle’s testimony, but it helped produce the largest jury verdict against the
company to date: a $9.2 million award in May to a Wichita woman who had to undergo a
hysterectomy after using the Dalkon Shield.”); Barry Siegel, The Right Question: One Man’s
Effort to Tell Dalkon Story, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/print/
1985-08-22/news/mn-2247_1_dalkon (describing testimony of Tuttle, a born-again Chris-
tian, who after “misplaced zeal” in defending Robins over which he came to “hang my head
in shame,” described the document destruction; also noting that the “impact [of the testi-
mony] has been considerable, and it has played a role in forcing Robins to seek protection in
bankruptcy court.”); Jane Sims Podesta, After a Lawyer Turns Whistle-Blower, the Company
That Made the Dalkon Shield Warns Women of Its Dangers, PEOPLE, Jan. 14, 1985, www.
people.com/people/archive/article/0,,2009069.00.html (quoting Professor Tuttle as telling his
students, “Stalk out in a rage if you believe a client’s wishes are unethical. Don’t hang
around.”).
21 This historical episode recently reached a mass audience through the Robert Redford-
directed movie THE CONSPIRATOR (The American Film Company & Wildwood Enterprises),
released in 2011, which starred James McAvoy as attorney Aiken, who, despite being an
ardent unionist and Lincoln supporter, sought to insure a fair trial for Surratt (played by
Robin Wright). Regardless of whether the movie accurately portrays Aiken, it serves to
illustrate a longstanding theme of American law and society: the attorney willing to take a
stand for fairness and justice in the face of emotion and even mob hysteria.
22 Outside the arena of their litigation, both Ceballos and Garcetti seem to be living rather
productive lives notwithstanding some criticism (discussed at greater length below). Cebal-
los continues as a deputy DA and as a community activist as well as a tequila distributor. See
Richard Ceballos Resume and Biography, available at www.law.uci.edu/pdf/ceballosCV.
pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012); Richard Ceballos, Opinion, Don’t Replace Pomona Police,
INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL., July 25, 2010; Richard Ceballos, Letter to the Editor, Don’t
Charge For Lanes, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB., June 17, 2009 (praising newspaper article
favoring greater whistleblower protection and contending that Los Angeles County has a
“custom and habit of ignoring the warnings of corruption, waste, and fraud brought forward
by . . . employees” and that often “reaction is to label the conscientious employee as
insubordinate, a troublemaker, or malcontent”); Richard Ceballos, Opinion, Prop. 5 A Mis-
guided Initiative, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB., Oct. 23, 2008 (opposing proposed legislation
that would “effectively provide narcotic offenders with virtual ‘get-out-of-jail’ cards, prohib-
iting judges from incarcerating those who continue to commit crimes in order to support
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In Garcetti v. Ceballos,23 the United States Supreme Court ruled that even
if Ceballos was completely correct and that he had spotted chicanery by the
Sheriff’s Department in falsifying an affidavit used to obtain a criminal convic-
tion, DA Garcetti was entitled to take adverse job action against Ceballos and
that this was not impermissible government punishment for Ceballos’ exercise
of his First Amendment rights.24
For reasons well said in the dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Garcetti v. Ceballos is poorly reasoned as a matter
of First Amendment doctrine.25 But for purposes of this Symposium, I wish to
focus on what makes Garcetti one of the Court’s “worst” from my perspec-
tive—the Court’s failure to recognize and appreciate—at least in its formal
disposition of the case—that Richard Ceballos was more than a public
employee voicing concern over an important failing of the workplace that
affected the public interest (although that still should have given him more
protection to speak what he regarded as the truth) but was an attorney sworn to
act as an officer of the Court and required to follow a professional responsibil-
ity code that not only permitted but required him to blow the whistle on false
affidavits used by prosecutors.26
their drug habits”); Richard Ceballos, Whistleblower Richard Ceballos Letter to Congress,
PUBLIC CITIZEN (May 14, 2007), http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2348 (stressing need
for greater whistleblower protection). Ceballos also ran unsuccessfully for Pomona City
Council. See Monica Rodriguez, Some Pomona Residents Hinting Recall After Romero’s
Ouster, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL., Dec. 16, 2008.
Garcetti, after his defeat for re-election as District Attorney in 2000, became a promi-
nent photographer as well as a producer of the TNT television serious The Closer and served
on the Los Angeles Ethics Commission. He was also profiled on a May 2006 segment of the
CBS News Program Sunday Morning with Charles Osgood. See, e.g., Beth Barrett, Garcettis
Take Heat Over Plan: Pair’s Actions on Term-Limit Measure Drawing Criticism, L.A.
DAILY NEWS., Aug. 9, 2006, at N1 (noting Garcetti’s chairpersonship of Ethics Commission
and son Eric’s status as L.A. City Council President but focusing on allegations that they
unfairly attempted to push through amendment of term limits restrictions); Suzanne
Muchnic, The Picks of Their Pics; Members of LACMA’s Photographic Counsel Share
Favorites From Their Diverse Personal Collections, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at D1 (not-
ing Garcetti’s “success in his second career as an urban photographer”).
23 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
24 See id. at 420–24.
25 See id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 427 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens
and Ginsburg); id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26 As discussed below, only Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion provides any real discussion
of Ceballos’ status as an attorney and his corresponding duties to the justice system. The
Court was of course aware that Ceballos was an attorney and that attorneys have certain
obligations to refrain from bringing tainted prosecutions and to be candid with courts. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (Oct. 12, 2005) (No.
04-473) (question of Justice Ginsburg) [hereinafter Transcript A], id. at 17–18 (colloquy
between Justice Souter and Garcetti counsel Cindy S. Lee, Esq.) (discussing prosecutor’s
obligations under Brady v. Maryland to disclose evidence tending to exonerate defendants),
and Transcript of Oral Re-argument at 8–9, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (March 21,
2006) (No. 04-473) (question of Justice Scalia) [hereinafter Transcript B]; id. at 9–10 (collo-
quy between Justice Ginsburg and Lee); id. at 53–55 (answer of Ceballos’ counsel Bonnie
Robin-Vergeer, Esq. to question of Justice Souter addresses attorney professional ethics,
whistleblowing, and “up ladder” reporting of improprieties to superiors); see also Transcript
B, supra, at 38–39 (question of Justice Scalia expressing concern that “loose cannons” in
DA’s office might be “accusing perfectly honest and respectable police officers of violating
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Mr. Ceballos could, of course, have been wrong about whether the Sheriff
erred. Mr. Ceballos might also have been unduly bellicose and counter-produc-
tive in the manner in which he raised the issue (although that seems unlikely
from the limited facts recited in the case). We will never know about the bona
fides of the Ceballos claims and contentions because the Court essentially
smothered his claim at birth with its overbroad ruling essentially stating that
public employees have no First Amendment rights to criticize occurrences in
the workplace—at least unless they are willing to be fired for speaking out, no
matter how important the workplace failings may be to the public interest. That
ruling, as the dissenters pointed out, was unwise and incorrect as a matter of
constitutional law. It also failed to appreciate the zone of freedom required of
attorneys working for organizations if lawyers are to properly fulfill their role
as officers of the court and occasional guardians of judicial fairness as well as
their role as partisan advocates.
Depressingly, only Justice Breyer’s dissent even touched upon the matter
of Mr. Ceballos as a lawyer as well as a dissident.27 More important, Mr.
Ceballos was a lawyer for the government and for the prosecution, entities
empowered to deprive persons of life and liberty and entities restricted in their
power by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If anyone
should have freedom to speak out internally against perceived police and
prosecutorial abuse without fear of job retaliation, it should have been attorneys
like Richard Ceballos—even if they are incorrect.
Instead of recognizing this, the Court majority relegated Deputy DA
Ceballos to the role of a mere functionary on an assembly line, someone who
could be fired merely because the boss disliked his taste in music, film, or
professional sports. Although one now almost expects laypersons to misunder-
stand or under-appreciate the role of the lawyer as a guardian of the system’s
integrity, it is particularly shocking that the Court as a whole failed so badly in
this regard.
The Ceballos saga began when Mr.Ceballos, a “calendar” deputy or super-
vising attorney in the DA’s Pomona branch office was contacted by a defense
attorney contending that there were inaccuracies in a search warrant used by
police28 to “obtain a critical search warrant.”29 Rather than disregarding
defense counsel, as one might cynically expect from prosecutors in an adver-
the law,” a sentiment arguably reflecting excessive concerns for inconvenience or difficulty
for law enforcement officials as compared to harm suffered by defendants through wrongful
prosecution or conviction).
Despite being at least somewhat aware of the professional responsibility implications of
the Garcetti case, nearly all Justices chose not to address its implications for the decision.
27 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446 (“[T]he speech at issue is professional speech—the speech of a
lawyer. Such speech is subject to independent regulation by canons of the profession. Those
canons provide an obligation to speak in certain instances. And where that is so, the govern-
ment’s own interest in forbidding that speech is diminished.”); see also id. at 447 (quoting
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 172 (1996) (“[P]rofessionals must
always qualify their loyalty and commitment to the vertical hierarchy of an organization by
their horizontal commitment to general professional norms and standards.”)).
28 The investigation and warrant activity in question was conducted by the L.A. County
Sheriff, but for each reference I will refer to law enforcement activity in the case as being
conducted by the “police.”
29 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413.
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sary system, Ceballos took the report seriously enough to investigate, visiting
the physical location involved and concluding that the police affidavit con-
tained “serious” errors amounting to “misrepresentations” to the court and that
the errors were likely not the result of mere inadvertence.30
Ceballos then pursued the matter with his supervising attorneys (Carol
Najera and Frank Sundstedt), drafting a “disposition memorandum” that recom-
mended dismissal of the case. The supervising attorneys and the police opposed
Ceballos, with “one lieutenant sharply criticizing Ceballos for his handling of
the case” and Sundstedt deciding to proceed with the case unless defendant’s
motion challenging the affidavit succeeded.31 At the motion hearing, Ceballos
testified in favor of the defense motion but the trial court rejected the challenge
to the affidavit.32 Two of the three defendants (Randy Longoria and Douglas
30 The problems Ceballos found with the affidavit’s accuracy were not trivial. The police
appear to have taken substantial liberty in stretching the description of the physical area in
order to paint a picture more conducive to obtaining a search warrant. See id. at 414
(According to Ceballos, the police “affidavit contained serious misrepresentations. The affi-
davit called a long driveway what Ceballos thought should have been referred to as a sepa-
rate roadway. Ceballos also questioned the affidavit’s statement that tire tracks [found on the
defendant’s property] led from a stripped-down truck to the premises covered by the warrant.
His doubts arose from his conclusion that the roadway’s composition in some places made it
difficult or impossible to leave visible tire tracks.”).
While it is of course possible that Ceballos was making a mountain out of a molehill, it
seems at least equally likely that he is describing excessive police liberty with the facts
designed to secure an improper search that could lead to a wrongful conviction. The true
version of facts or characterization of the Ceballos concerns is a question of fact. By declar-
ing blanket Section 1983 immunity to prosecutors suppressing attorney speech of this type,
the Court prevents this necessary factual inquiry and creates a situation where it can become
standard DA practice to twist facts to obtain convictions. A deputy DA who believes that
improprieties have taken place and wishes to speak out as required by the rules of attorney
professional conduct must do so at the risk of arbitrary dismissal.
31 See id. at 414–15.
32 See id. The Ninth Circuit’s account of the entire incident is considerably more detailed
than that of the Supreme Court and paints the DA defendants, and the performance of the
DA’s office and the judicial system, in a considerably less flattering light.
Ceballos discussed the problems arising from this investigation with others in the Office, includ-
ing his immediate supervisor, Carol Najera and the then-Head Deputy District Attorney Frank
Sundstedt. Everyone agreed that the validity of the warrant was questionable. On March 2,
2000, Ceballos sent Sundstedt a memorandum discussing his determination that the affidavit was
falsified and recommending that the case be dismissed. Sundstedt instructed Ceballos to revise
the memorandum to make it less accusatory of the deputy sheriff. Ceballos rewrote the memo-
randum, and a meeting was held . . . with representatives from the Sheriff’s Department, Sund-
stedt, Najera, Ceballos and another deputy district attorney.
Following the meeting with the Sheriff’s Department, Sundstedt was not certain that [Peo-
ple v.] Cusky [the underlying case] should be dismissed and decided to proceed with the case
pending the outcome of a motion challenging the search warrant, which had already been filed
by the defense. Ceballos informed defense counsel that he believed the affidavit contained false
statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify at the hearing. Ceballos told Najera
that pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and other case law, he was obliged to turn over to the defense
the memoranda he had prepared regarding his opinion of the legality of the search warrant.
Ceballos contends that Najera instructed him to edit the memorandum to include statements by
only one detective and to limit his in-court testimony. When Ceballos testified at the hearing on
the motion, the Cusky court sustained the prosecution’s objections to several questions defense
counsel asked him. Ceballos maintains that, as a result, he was unable to tell the court certain of
his conclusions (and the reasons therefore) regarding the accuracy of the warrant. The defen-
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Ojala) pled guilty to charges of illegal possession of weapons and
methamphetamine while defendant Michael Cuskey stood trial and was
convicted.33
After losing in his bid to prevent a prosecution he regarded as improper,
Ceballos claimed “he was subjected to a series of retaliatory employment
actions” that “included reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial
deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion.”34
He filed a grievance that was denied on the ground of insufficient retaliation
and then sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of his First and
dant’s motion was denied, and the prosecution proceeded. Having testified for the defense,
Ceballos was removed from the Cusky prosecution team.
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
Najera, who was involved in the famous Menendez Brothers prosecution, and remains a
deputy DA, apparently is seen by some as very aggressive. See Menendez Brothers on Trial:
Juror Speaks Out, CNN.COM, Dec. 10, 2007 (reporter asks juror whether Najera was “over-
bearing at times” during trial, an assertion denied by the juror, who described Najera as
“very soft spoken”). Sundstedt, a 29-year veteran of the DA’s office, joined his brother’s law
firm in March 2001, approximately a year after the dust-up with Ceballos. See LAW OFFICES
OF MICHAEL J. SUNDSTEDT, www.sundlaw.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (also noting that
Frank E. Sundstedt, Jr., participated in more than 175 criminal jury trials and was selected to
the prestigious American College of Trial Lawyers in 1996).
An even more pro-Ceballos account that reads quite damningly toward his antagonists
is found in Jim Crogan, Soft on Crime Fighters, LA WEEKLY, Dec. 22, 2000, at 22. Sund-
stedt in particular looks excessively heated when quoted calling Ceballos a “goddamn liar”
who Sundstedt accuses of bringing the Section 1983 litigation as a “thinly veiled, politically
motivated attempt to affect the outcome of the [2000] election for D.A.” because the suit was
filed on October 18, 2000. Garcetti was defeated in November 2000. Id. In response to the
Ceballos concerns that the police affidavit was inaccurate, Sundstedt is quoted saying that
“no one ever elected [Ceballos] judge and jury.” Id. True enough, but Sundstedt as an exper-
ienced lawyer surely understands that attorneys are constantly making assessments of the
type proffered by Ceballos in order to properly exercise prosecutorial discretion and to com-
ply with ethics-in-litigation directives such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Although the LA Weekly
article is clearly sympathetic to Ceballos, if accurate, it presents a picture of Sundstedt pro-
testing way too much and in that sense gives credence to the Ceballos claims.
33 See Crogan, supra note 32, at 22. Defendant Ojala pled guilty prior to the court proceed-
ings involving the Ceballos testimony while Defendant Longoria pled guilty after the unsuc-
cessful motion to quash the search warrant. All three defendants received “a six-month
sentence with the option of either doing Caltrans roadwork or reporting to the county’s tree
farm.” Id. at 23.
The Crogan article also provides somewhat more detail about the nature of Cuskey’s
property (the site of the search) and gives further description of the discrepancies between
the police affidavit (involving deputies Daniel Spitulski and Murray Simpkins as well as
detective Keith Wall) and Ceballos’ observations about the property. According to Ceballos
“the so-called ‘driveway’ [leading directly to Cuskey’s house] was actually an access road
shared by all the residents on the street” and “was a mixture of asphalt, gravel and dirt,
making it impossible for anyone to follow tracks along its surface.” Id. Further, “an aban-
doned truck [(described in the affidavit)] was found about 400 feet away from Cuskey’s
property, not the 30 feet later claimed in court by these deputies during the hearing to dis-
miss the search warrant.” Id. Also, the police “got the address wrong on the search warrant.”
See id. at 23. These discrepancies and the fact that Cuskey and his property had been
targeted for some time led Ceballos to conclude that the “deputies’ real purpose was always
to look for narcotics, and they used the abandoned truck as a red herring to disguise their
intention.” See id. at 23 (quoting Ceballos).
34 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
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Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the retaliation.35 The District Attorney
(Gil Garcetti36), in addition to contending that there had been no retaliation,
also argued that Ceballos’ conduct was not protected speech because he had
spoken as a deputy DA and county worker rather than as a public citizen
addressing matters of general public concern.37 The trial court rejected the
Ceballos claim but the Ninth Circuit reversed, setting the stage for the Supreme
Court’s opinion.38
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit view that Ceballos had a
viable Section 1983 claim, largely applying the First Amendment doctrine set
35 See id. The retaliatory actions of which Ceballos complained “included reassignment
from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse,
and denial of a promotion.” Id. In addition to asserting that Ceballos enjoyed no First
Amendment protection for his statements, the District Attorney contended that “all [of] the
actions of which [Ceballos] complained were explained by legitimate reasons such as staff-
ing needs.” Id. The Ninth Circuit opinion presents in greater detail the nature of the retalia-
tion alleged by Ceballos, listing eight particulars. See Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1171–72; see
also Crogan, supra note 32, at 22–24.
36 Prior to becoming a celebrated photographer, Garcetti was Los Angeles DA from 1992 to
2000 and is most prominently known as the District Attorney during the notoriously failed
prosecution of former football star O.J. Simpson for the murder of his estranged wife Nicole
Brown Simpson and her friend Ron Goldman. He was defeated in the 2000 election by
challenger Steve Cooley in a campaign where the failed Simpson prosecution was a signifi-
cant political issue adversely reflecting on Garcetti’s competence. As noted above, he subse-
quently began a second career of sorts as a photographer, and was involved as an actor and
collaborator with several television crime shows. See Gil Garcetti, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.orghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gil_Garcetti (last visited Mar. 9, 2012); see also
Suzanne Muchnic, Quick Takes; Garcetti Photos at U.N., L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2009, at D2
(describing Garcetti as a “prominent photographer” presenting exhibits of his work at the
United Nations General Assembly).
It has long been local lore among Los Angeles lawyers that Garcetti insisted that the
Simpson trial be held in downtown L.A. rather than the nearer to the Brentwood location
where the killings occurred. In doing so, Garcetti gave himself a better vantage point for
monitoring the proceedings but did so at the cost of ensuring a substantially more African-
American jury, which proved to be unduly sympathetic to Simpson’s claim that he was
railroaded because of the racist tendencies of the L.A. police. See, e.g., GILLERS, supra note
7, at 469–70 (“Moving Pictures” note); Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 37 (describing court-permitted jury visit to Simpson’s home prior
to which Simpson counsel had replaced evidence of Simpson’s ties to white America with
substantial Africanization of the home’s de´cor to emphasize Simpson’s roots and status as a
prominent black American).
Of course, permitting the jury to visit the unsecured Simpson home was only one of a
number of terribly wrong aspects of the Simpson prosecution, some of which must be attrib-
uted to Garcetti and the prosecution team as well as to the star-struck trial judge Lance Ito.
Certainly, this particularly awful episode cannot be laid solely at the feet of Garcetti and his
prosecutors generally (who opposed the visit but apparently lacked the presence of mind to
obtain an injunction that the Simpson home not be altered prior to the visit). But revisiting
the serial bungling of the OJ prosecution prompts at least some concern that the Garcetti
DA’s office might indeed have been sufficiently ill-managed to overlook valid attorney com-
plaints about police misconduct and to punish whistleblowers rather than seeking to rectify
whistleblower complaints.
37 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
38 Id.
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forth in Connick v. Myers,39 and Pickering v. Board of Education.40 The Court
majority read those precedents as imposing a bright line distinction between
government employee speech on the job about their job (which was not pro-
tected) and a government employee speaking as a citizen (or perhaps other
activities in other parts of the employer’s organization), which was subject to
protection. “So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of
public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary
for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”41 But where “public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”42
The majority sought through this bright line position “both to promote the
individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citi-
zens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government
employers attempting to perform their important public functions.”43 Accord-
ing to the majority,
Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee in
his or her professional capacity. Official communications have official consequences,
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors must ensure that
their employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment,
and promote the employer’s mission. Ceballos’ memo is illustrative. It demanded the
attention of his supervisors and led to a heated meeting with employees from the
sheriff’s department. If Ceballos’ superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or
misguided, they had the authority to take proper corrective action.44
Cynics among us might read this paragraph as one giving the green light
to employers to smash employees who have the temerity to deviate from the
employer’s party line or to question the propriety of employer practices. This is
regrettable enough where the government employer and activity involve activi-
ties such as paving roads, landscaping parks, or processing licenses. It becomes
truly mischievous where that government employer’s activity is prosecution of
crime with the potential consequence of incarceration of a defendant on the
basis of falsified information.
The Garcetti majority has it completely backwards. The law should not
give employers “heightened interests in controlling speech made by an
employee in his or her professional capacity” but rather should give profession-
als adequate breathing space to properly discharge their professional obliga-
tions—to both employers and to the law.
Where the government task is prosecution, the employer’s need for “con-
sistency and clarity” must yield to the truth. Consistent and clear railroading of
defendants is hardly in the public interest and lawyers like Richard Ceballos
39 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The Connick of the opinion is long-time New
Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick, who is perhaps better known as the father of musi-
cian and actor Harry Connick, Jr. See Harry Connick, Sr., WIKIPEDIA http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Harry_Connick,_Sr. (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
40 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
41 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.
42 Id. at 421.
43 Id. at 420.
44 Id. at 422–23.
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should be permitted to speak up to prevent perceived injustice, even if this
results in “heated” exchanges with supervisors. The prosecutor/employer “mis-
sion” is not simply making the prosecutorial trains run on time, it is ensuring
that the process is fair and does not treat defendants and other participants in
the system (e.g., jurors, witnesses, counsel) unfairly.
This value is strong enough to tolerate the occasional errors of some
whistleblowing attorneys. If a dissident like Ceballos is a poor worker, he can
readily be disciplined or discharged for legitimate reasons and any subsequent
1983 litigation is unlikely to be successful or particularly taxing to the govern-
ment. As a practical matter, all but the crankiest of cranks will be reluctant to
take a stand against his or her work hierarchy without reasonably strong evi-
dence of impropriety. Although Garcetti arguably spares the government the
costs and inconvenience of weak First Amendment wrongful discharge claims,
it does so at the cost of deterring potentially valuable input from lawyers fairly
and accurately seeking to discharge their ethical obligations.
Further, the issue of whether an employee’s work demonstrates “sound
judgment” or is “inflammatory” or “misguided” does not logically give the
prosecutor/employer carte blanche to discharge or discipline the employee who
finds prosecutorial abuse and speaks out about it. At a minimum, the employee
should have the chance to show that the adverse job action was in retaliation for
speech (particularly speech that calls the professional employer into account for
professional failings) rather than due to some deficiency of job performance.
Similarly, the employer seeking to discharge or discipline the subordinate attor-
ney who dares to speak out should have a better reason for the adverse job
action than merely that the employee’s speech and actions have made the boss
uncomfortable.
Overlooked by the Court majority opinion and dissents, save for that of
Justice Breyer, is that under the relevant ethical rules to which Ceballos was
subject, he was essentially required to protest as he did once discovering the
problems with the police affidavit at issue.45 An array for legal ethics rules and
45 As noted in note 26, supra, the Court at oral argument was aware that Ceballos, as an
attorney, had particular ethical responsibilities. See Transcript A, supra note 26, at 7; Tran-
script B, supra note 26, at 9. But in the course of deciding the case, only Justice Breyer’s
dissent addressed this concern at any length. Perhaps even more than the disappointing
majority opinion that emphasizes employer prerogatives and a perceived need for top-down
control of workers, the Transcripts are replete with concern that lazy or “insubordinate”
workers will undermine the employer and that the employer will face undue burdens in
disciplining or discharging such workers.
The Court’s concern is overstated in that it paints too gloomy a picture of the costs of
defending employee retaliation suits. To a large degree, defending such claims is simply the
modest cost of giving workers rights and fostering the public’s right to know. As a practical
matter, these cases are unlikely to take much time or energy of the defendants unless the
allegations have significant merit, a fact noted by Justice Souter at both oral argument and in
his Garcetti dissent. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 435–36 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.); Transcript A, supra note 26, at 3–4; see also Transcript B, supra
note 26, at 34 (colloquy between Justice Scalia and Ceballos counsel on this issue).
In addition, the Court, particularly the Garcetti majority, seems to misunderstand the
nature of public employment. The Los Angeles DA’s office is not the functional equivalent
of a small family business, rock band, or movie cast where a recalcitrant dissident can thwart
the objectives of the entity whose members have an almost unfettered right to do things as
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norms reflected in the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct practically mandated that Ceballos act upon his belief that the policy
affidavit was defective.46
Rule 3.1 requires that attorneys put forth only “meritorious claims and
contentions.”47 If the police affidavit was defective, the prosecution’s case was
non-meritorious, at least in some part. Rule 3.3 requires that attorneys display
“candor toward the tribunal.”48 If the policy affidavit was inaccurate as posited
by Ceballos, the DA’s office was not being candid with the court. Rule 3.8
posits that there are “special responsibilities of a prosecutor” and provides that
a prosecutor “refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause” as well as imposing other requirements such as
disclosure of information tending to exculpate the defendant and to alert the
court to potential wrongful convictions.49
they see fit (subject to outright concerns of illegality that may permit whistleblowing even in
these situations). Rather, professionals working in the public sector have independent profes-
sional obligations to serve the public at large rather than merely the constituents who have
managerial authority over a government entity.
Gil Garcetti was of course the DA, just as Frank Sundstedt and Carol Najera were
employees of higher rank than Ceballos. But none of these persons were really the entity to
whom Ceballos and other lawyer employees owe allegiance. That entity was the County of
Los Angeles as an amalgamation of the citizens of the County. Where an employee accu-
rately sees the managerial constituents violating duties to the entity, the employee is hardly
being an “insubordinate” or “loose cannon” but instead is being a faithful steward of the
citizenry. Add to that the obligations of a government lawyer to the judicial system and the
need to be fair to opponents and third parties and the result is a potent formula for protecting
the rights of dissidents like Ceballos unless it can be demonstrated that their contentions are
unreasonable or made in an unnecessarily disruptive manner. But under Garcetti, these
harder questions are not addressed and the constituent “bosses” of the public entity enjoy
immunity.
46 The ABA has been promulgating rules of legal ethics since 1908. These model codes do
not automatically have the force of law but must be enacted by the relevant state supreme
court or legislature, as California has done in essentially codifying the ABA Rules. Because
the wrongfulness of the Garcetti decision for lawyers is national in scope, I dwell on the
ABA Rules rather than their California counterparts, even though it is these counterparts that
are technically the positive law applicable to Ceballos and other members of the California
Bar.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were initially released in 1983 and have been
updated repeatedly, with the most extensive recent revisions taking place in 2002 as part of
the ABA’s “Ethics 2000” project. Although the ABA does not have direct regulatory author-
ity over lawyers, the Model Rules (and before that the Model Court of Professional Respon-
sibility (1969) and its Canons of Ethics (1908)) have been enormously influential.
As noted above, before an ethical rule has the force of law, it must be adopted by a
state’s high court or enacted by a state legislature. The current Model Rules have been essen-
tially adopted verbatim in nearly every state, with some states displaying some significant
deviation regarding isolated aspects of a particular rule or subtopic. For the most part, how-
ever, the ABA Model Rules are the “law of the land” regarding lawyer professional respon-
sibility and reflect the attorney’s obligations to clients, opponents, third parties, and the
justice system.
47 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006).
48 See id. R. 3.3.
49 See id. R. 3.8(a), (d), (g) & (h).
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Importantly, Rule 3.4 requires that lawyers display “fairness to [the]
opposing party and counsel.”50 If the police affidavit used to obtain a search
warrant was materially inaccurate, the DA’s office was not being fair to the
defendant or defense counsel. Specifically, Rule 3.4 states that an attorney shall
not “falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or . . . know-
ingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal.”51 To the extent that
the police affidavit at issue would be used in court, Rule 3.4 was strongly
implicated and Ceballos was obligated to speak out if he found significant
problems with the affidavit or the prosecution generally.
Apart from the black letter rules, the ABA Model Rules also reflects a
general ethic of the profession, counseling that lawyers are more than litigation
gladiators whose only job is to pursue victory. The Preamble to the Model
Code regarding “A Lawyer’s Responsibilities” states that an attorney is not
only a “representative of clients” but is also “an officer of the legal system and
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”52 Fur-
ther, “[a] lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system” because it is
both a “lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official
action” and to “uphold [the] legal process.”53
Although the lawyers’ roles as a representative of a client and an officer of
the legal system and public citizen are “usually harmonious,” lawyers must also
be willing to challenge improper government action.54 Nowhere in the Model
Code is there the suggestion that these attorney duties dissolve when the gov-
ernment is the attorney’s “client” or employer. Further, the Model Rules are
“rules of reason,” that must be given a sensible and functional construction.55
This suggests that the attorney role of zealous advocate logically yields where
counsel has genuine concern about the accuracy or fairness of litigation, partic-
ularly when counsel acts as a government prosecutor.
Case law reflects the prevailing view that, contrary to the majority’s sug-
gestion in Garcetti, lawyers seeking to uphold professional standards should be
given both breathing space and protection from adverse job action. For exam-
ple, New York law firm associate Howard Wieder, who had retained another
attorney in the firm to represent him during a condominium purchase, con-
cluded that the attorney had lied to him and reported the matter to the firm,
insisting that the incident be reported to state bar regulators. The firm eventu-
ally complied but fired Wieder, who then sued for wrongful discharge on pub-
lic policy grounds. New York’s highest court agreed that his action could
proceed.56
50 See id. R. 3.4.
51 See id. R. 3.4(b) & (c).
52 See id. pmbl. [1].
53 See id. pmbl. [5].
54 See id. pmbl. [8], [9], [11].
55 See id. Scope [14].
56 See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992); accord Kelly v. Hunton & Williams,
No. 97 CV 5631, 1999 Westlaw 408416 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1999). The Wieder Court’s
appreciation of lawyer professional responsibility is especially notable because New York
law generally has been reluctant to create public policy exceptions to the general rule that at-
will employees may be fired for any reason, even arbitrary or reprehensible reasons. See
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Similarly, whistleblowing in-house lawyers usually have not been stripped
of their rights to sue for wrongful discharge merely because as lawyers they
owe duties of confidence and loyalty to their single employer clients.57
Although there are cases to the contrary58 as well as cases inconsistent with
Wieder and arguably more Garcetti-like in tone and outcome,59 it appears that
the law of a private lawyer’s rights to sue for adverse job actions related to the
attorney’s stand in favor of professional obligations is considerably more pro-
tective than the rights of a government attorney to assert a constitutional tort
under Garcetti. Logically, public prosecutors subject to the standard ethical
obligations of counsel and the special responsibilities of a prosecuting attorney
should have more protection than private lawyers who are not part of an office
wielding the coercive legal and political power of the state.
Under Garcetti and its categorical distinctions between speech in the
workplace (even if a professional workplace) and speech in society at large, the
prosecutor/employer is given the right to take even arbitrary adverse employ-
ment actions when the attorney/employee is simply doing what is profession-
ally required. In effect, the Garcetti DA’s office was allowed to arbitrarily
punish Richard Ceballos even if Mr. Ceballos was being a good, conscientious,
and responsible attorney.60 Whatever the merits of the constitutional law as
GILLERS, supra note 7, at 579; see also, e.g., Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919
(N.Y. 1987).
To be clear, the decision does not necessarily mean that Wieder’s claim was factually
accurate (although the law firm’s reporting of the matter to the bar suggests Wieder was on
to something). Attorneys who claim misconduct by other attorneys must still sustain the
burden of demonstrating the factual bona fides of the charges.
57 See, e.g., Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2002) (in-house
counsel contending improper firing due to complaint about ethics violation of superior may
bring cause of action for wrongful discharge; no bar merely because employee was in-house
lawyer subject to ethical rules regarding use of ethically protected client confidences); Burk-
hart v. Semitool, Inc., 5 P.3d 1031 (Mont. 2000); GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart, 653
N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1995); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994)
(same, but confidentiality duties of attorney place some restraint on proof that attorney may
present in wrongful discharge litigation). The leading case to the contrary, Balla v. Gambro,
Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991), has been criticized by many commentators, but has its
defenders. See GILLERS, supra note 7, at 578–79 (citing to cross-section of articles) and
following note.
58 See, e.g., Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 104 (in-house attorney may not bring wrongful discharge
suit for firing related to complaints about safety of employer’s product because litigation of
action would require attorney to disclose client confidences); see also GILLERS, supra note 7,
at 578–79 (citing to cross-section of articles). Balla, however bad a decision I might think it
to be, has more intellectual credibility than Garcetti because Attorney Balla’s corporate
employer was at substantial economic risk from the disclosures of in-house counsel that
were fueled by information protected by the ABA Model Rule 1.6 duty not to disclose ethi-
cally protected information. By contrast, the police affidavit that Ceballos viewed as inaccu-
rate was in the public domain. Further, the Ceballos complaint to his superiors was “in-
house” whistleblowing. He never took his concerns over the accuracy and fairness of the
prosecution to the media or other third parties and attacked the affidavit through the judicial
process.
59 See, e.g., Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) (associate attorney
alleging firing by law firm due to complaints about unethical billing by partner may not
bring wrongful discharge action).
60 Subsequent events suggest that Mr. Ceballos was indeed something more than a crank or
disgruntled employee. He continues to hold a position in the DA’s office and appears to have
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enunciated in the Connick-Pickering-Garcetti line of cases for lay government
workers, it is an affront to the legal profession and public policy when applied
to attorneys working for the government.
Various definitions of professionalism exist that emphasize different
aspects of the concept but all generally agree that professionals are workers
who have substantial education and training in a reasonably sophisticated field
of technical knowledge, with control over entry to the profession, admission
and certification requirements, ongoing regulation by the profession itself, and
required adherence to a code of professional conduct and a body of professional
norms.61 Although the modern era has brought a tendency to try to treat too
many workers as professionals (e.g., the hairdresser or landscaper who speaks
of his “clients” who are really better described as “customers” if we still take
professionalism seriously), most agree that the true professionals of society are
its traditional five professions (law, medicine, clergy, military, and university
teaching) and probably the emerging modern professions of engineering,
accounting, and architecture as well.62
Without denigrating any of the traditional professions or the modern
emerging professions, one can say (I hope without controversy) that lawyers
and the legal profession hold a particularly important place in society’s system
of justice. Lawyers represent those prosecuting and defending criminal and
civil matters. Lawyers sit as judges adjudicating these matters and have sub-
stantial authority to overturn or disregard the views of lay jurors. Although the
traditional role of lawyers in state legislatures and Congress has diminished
during the past four decades, lawyers still play a crucial role in making the law
beyond standard common law adjudication.
Recognizing the role of the attorney and the need for lawyer professional-
ism, American law has for more than a century codified expectations of law-
yers that include a command that lawyers not only serve clients but also
safeguard the judicial system. Today, that ethos is embodied in the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and countless judicial opinions and state bar
ethics opinions.
I am not naı¨ve enough to suggest that, as an empirical matter, lawyers
wake up every morning with thoughts of serving the system foremost in the
frontal lobes of their brains. A New Yorker cartoon from the 1970s featuring a
mythical senior partner and associate at a cocktail party (“We practice law to
significant involvement in public issues through expressing opinions in the local media on
topics such as whether to abolish the Pomona California police department and seeking
(apparently unsuccessfully) a seat on the Pomona City Counsel. See Rodriguez, supra note
22.
61 See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 59 (1986); GILLERS, supra note 7, at 15–16 (discussing professional-
ism); see also EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (Cornelia
Brookfield trans., Routledge 2d ed. 1992); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFE-
SIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFI-
CIAL PERSON (1992); Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, 17 SOCIAL
FORCES 457 (1939).
62 See generally sources cited supra note 61.
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make money, Hawkins. If you can think of a better reason, let’s hear it”)63
captures rather well the work-a-day necessity of being a lawyer, at least in
private practice. For government prosecutors on a fixed salary, the mantra often
becomes that the prosecutor practices law to “obtain convictions” or “put bad
guys away” or simply to “win.”
But the slouching of the daily reality of law practice from its more noble
aspirations of justice and fairness should not obscure that lawyers who occa-
sionally “blow the whistle” on unfair or illegal practices, even if incorrect in
their assessment, are simply doing their jobs every bit as much as the zealous
advocate or the loyal subordinate lawyer is doing his or her job. If anything, the
reality of daily practice should be cause for celebrating the lawyer willing to be
the “house crank” about the niceties of procedural fairness. Even if this lawyer
is wrong, he or she performs a valuable public service. More important, it is a
public service that is part and parcel to the lawyer’s job description.
The Supreme Court (save for Justice Breyer) overlooked this aspect of
lawyer professionalism, with the Garcetti majority seeming to take the view
that lawyers taking their ethical responsibilities seriously are bugs to be swatted
and squished with impunity by their employers. That a group of lawyers could
hold such an impoverished view of lawyering is what makes Garcetti v. Cebal-
los such a bad Supreme Court opinion.
Instead of celebrating (or at least tolerating) the efforts of Richard Cebal-
los to be an officer of the court rather than a cog in the prosecutorial machine,
the Garcetti majority treated him as if he were a Bolshevik seeking to disturb
the essential order of the universe. The majority’s rhetoric about employer con-
trol of workers, the need for consistency and avoiding dissent in the workplace
smacks more of a plantation than an office of legal professionals. By the major-
ity’s reasoning, dissenting justices should be fired—or at least would have no
claim for relief if evicted from their chambers and relocated to portable trailers
in the RFK Stadium parking lot.64
63 The quote and description of the cartoon is from memory but was previously memorial-
ized closer to the time I first saw the cartoon. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent:
The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Pro-
fession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 45, n.82 (1999).
64 I realize that courts, government law offices, and lawyers in private practice have differ-
ent jobs. Most prominently, courts are set up so that they (at least in theory) have no “cli-
ents” and no allegiance to anything but fair and just application of the law. But this
difference between judges and lawyers, like most anything else in the world, is a matter of
degree rather than a day/night distinction. The Court, or at least Justice Breyer, seemed to
appreciate this at the initial oral argument in Garcetti. See Transcript A, supra note 26, at
31–32 (suggesting that Court’s law clerks would be addressing matters of public concern
every day on the job). The implication, of course, is that if deputy DA Ceballos can have a
Section 1983 cause of action for protesting perceived professional misconduct, the same
regime would obtain for a law clerk who was fired for protesting internally a Justice’s breach
of judicial ethics or violation of the law. Although this might seem disastrous to the Garcetti
majority, it seems the correct rule to me (and the prospect at least did not prevent Justice
Breyer from supporting the Ceballos position in his dissent). Society has a strong interest in
having the professional staff of judges bring such issues to the attention of judges and in
protecting such staff from retaliation when staffers attempt to prevent breaches of judicial
ethics or other law. Lawyers should not be cheating, and lawyers who see cheating in their
law office or government agency should be speaking out against it and trying to stop it.
Government lawyers, who as agents of the state wield the awesome power of the state, have
720 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:703
As noted above, Mr. Ceballos was perhaps a misguided crank. But
whether he was a loose cannon or a stalwart of fairness in an agency that had
lost its way is a fact question. If he suffered adverse job action merely for
trying to protect the fairness of the system, he should have a claim for relief
against his superiors who punished him for attempting to prevent the railroad-
ing of a criminal defendant. If he was badly off base and there were valid
reasons for the adverse job action, the defendants should prevail. But under
Garcetti, the defendants need not even be called to account for their action.
Even blatant punishment of the honest and good district attorney is immunized.
Ironically, the Garcetti majority immunizes such terrible behavior on the
ground that the attorney who is obligated to speak up against injustice spoke up
on the job rather than on a soapbox in MacArthur Park. This type of addled,
excessively formal, Catch-22 type of reasoning further emphasizes the badness
of Garcetti v. Ceballos. In effect, the Supreme Court permitted a district attor-
ney to punish a deputy for disagreeing with the police and getting in the way of
a supervisor who perhaps wanted a conviction more than to observe the rules of
fair play regarding probable cause.
In a clash between two lawyers, the DA might reasonably side with the
senior attorney—although this still does not justify retaliation. More trouble-
some is that the DA appears to be siding with the police over what appears to
be a sincere and well-founded concern of a lawyer in the office. I like cops as
well as the next guy, but if there is a dispute about the legal propriety of an
affidavit and a warrant, logic would seem to suggest that the lawyer is more
likely to be correct than is the cop, absent strong evidence that the attorney is
off base. Instead, it appears that the Garcetti DA’s office had it backwards.
Under these circumstances, one has a right to ask who is in charge regarding
questions of law: the lawyers or the cops?65
Garcetti has been almost uniformly condemned in newspaper editorials
and scholarly articles.66 Not surprisingly, most attack its constitutional reason-
enhanced responsibilities. They are not—or at least should not be—the cogs in the machine
portrayed by the Garcetti majority.
65 I am taking a bit of liberty here by perhaps understating the role of assistant DAs Carol
Najera and Frank Sundstedt, who apparently disagreed with Ceballos as to the alleged
problems with the police affidavit. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006). How-
ever, my reading of the Supreme Court’s description of the aftermath of the Ceballos com-
plaints to these colleagues is that they essentially defended the “warrant affiant and other
employees from the sheriff’s department” who attended the meeting spurred by the Ceballos
complaints. See id. There is no indication of any particular legal assessment or factual inves-
tigation by Sundstedt or Najera, which leads me to believe that they in essence took the
police side of the argument and dismissed the accuracy of the Ceballos concerns. But see
Crogan, supra note 32 (description of intra-office conflict between Ceballos and Najera/
Sundstedt suggesting more disagreement over correctness of Ceballos legal analysis).
66 A June 15, 2011 Lexis search revealed approximately one hundred law review or bar
journal articles discussing the case as some length. With the exception of law firm newslet-
ter-type articles or straight accounts of the case without commentary, the legal literature was
almost uniform in addressing Garcetti negatively. A similar pattern is reflected in news
articles and editorials about Garcetti. See, e.g., Troy Anderson, Employees Who Blow the
Whistle Contend They Are Left Whistling in the Wind, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL., June 8,
2009; Kenneth F. Bunting, Editorial, Court Makes Strange, Illogical Ruling, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 2, 2006, at B6; Editorial, Blow the Whistle! Court Gets Ruling Wrong,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 1, 2006, at 29; Linda Greenhouse, Some Whistle-Blowers Lose
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ing,67 with significant criticism focusing on insufficient respect for workers’
rights.68 Only a few have attacked its failure to accord attorneys the profes-
sional breathing space they need and deserve if they are to be officers of court
serving the justice system.69 Unfortunately, Garcetti has been as embraced by
the judiciary as it has been shunned by the academy and the press. The decision
has been cited nearly 3,000 times, usually it appears (I have not attempted to
review every case citing Garcetti in great detail) in aid of dismissing a
worker’s claim of retaliatory discharge arising out of whistleblowing.70 In the
battle for social control, Garcetti appears to have become a significant arrow in
the quiver of the power elite who wish to muffle criticism.
Garcetti continues to work its mischief. In its most recent term, the Court
decided Connick v. Thompson,71 another shamefully bad opinion that is a con-
tender for the Court’s worst case. In Thompson, the Court stripped a wrongfully
convicted plaintiff of a $14 million jury award arising out of his unfair treat-
ment by the New Orleans DA’s office led by the same Harry Connick, Sr. who
was part of Connick v. Myers. John Thompson, whose “story reads like a real-
life plot out of a John Grisham novel,” was erroneously convicted of murder,
with the DA’s office knowingly failing to disclose evidence tending to exoner-
ate Thompson.
In 1985, he and another man were arrested and charged in the murder of a
New Orleans businessman. In their investigation, Orleans Parish prosecutors
linked Thompson to the armed robbery of three siblings committed three weeks
after the December 1984 murder. During that robbery, the assailant’s blood
stained one of the victim’s pant legs. A swatch was tested by a crime lab, but
the results (which tended to exculpate Thompson; more on that below) were
never revealed by prosecutors to Thompson’s attorneys.
Free-Speech Protections, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A16; ACLU Denounces Supreme
Court Ruling in Whistleblower Case, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, May 30, 2006.
67 See, e.g., Matthew R. Schroll, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Misconstruing Precedent to
Curtail Government Employees’ First Amendment Rights, 67 MD. L. REV. 485, 485, 501,
507–08 (2008); Susan Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights
Through Pseudocommunication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1545, 1559–62 (2008); Margaret
Tarkington, Government Speech and the Publicly Employed Attorney, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV.
2175, 2175–79 (2010).
68 See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of
Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 22, 25–26 (2008);
Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti
v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 209–10, 218–20,
229–30 (2008); Robert S. Rosborough IV, A “Great” Day for Academic Freedom: The
Threat Posed to Academic Freedom by the Supreme Court’s Decision in Garcetti v. Cebal-
los, 72 ALB. L. REV. 565, 592 (2009).
69 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-
First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1262–63 (2009); Bruce A.
Green, Prosecutors’ Professional Independence: Reflections on Garcetti v. Ceballos, CRIM.
JUST., Summer 2007, at 4, 6.
70 LexisNexis Search, June 15, 2011. See, e.g., JoNel Newman, Will Teachers Shed Their
First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate? The Eleventh Circuits’s Post-Garcetti
Jurisprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761, 790–91 (2009) (reviewing cases from one court of
appeals and finding substantial adverse impact of Garcetti precedent on employee claims).
71 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
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Prosecutors chose first to try Thompson in the armed robbery, for which a
conviction could be invoked in support of the death penalty (for Thompson in
the murder case). At least four prosecutors in the Orleans Parish district attor-
ney’s office knew of the blood evidence, but none of them disclosed that to the
defense. And just before the trial one of the prosecutors, Assistant District
Attorney Gerry Deegan, removed the bloody swatch from the evidence in the
case to keep its existence unknown to the defense.
Thompson was convicted of the armed robbery and later of the separate
murder, and still the blood evidence went unknown to his lawyers.72
While he was on death row, Thompson’s conviction was challenged.
Weeks before he was scheduled for execution, a private investigator discovered
the blood sample—which showed that the blood type of the armed robber was
Type B while Thompson’s was Type O—evidence strongly suggesting that
Thompson was not the robber (or at least that the DA was wrong about him
being the robber), that he in turn was not the murderer, and that even if he was
the murderer, the tainted robbery conviction should not have been used to
obtain a death penalty sentence.73
Notwithstanding this evidence both of Thompson’s innocence and heinous
prosecutorial misconduct, the DA tried Thompson again for the murder after
Thompson’s successful habeas corpus petition—and he was quickly acquitted.
Thompson in turn sued for violation of his civil rights, alleging that he had
been denied due process by government actors. The jury agreed and rendered a
$14 million verdict.74 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Thompson’s
favor, ruling that his was not a proper Section 1983 claim because there was
insufficient evidence that his civil rights were violated because of a policy of
the prosecutor’s office rather than the isolated misconduct of employees of the
prosecutor’s office.75 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, government officials cannot be
held liable on respondeat superior grounds but the plaintiff must show that his
injury stemmed from a policy of the defendant.76 Thompson alleged that the
defective policy was failure of the DA to train personnel in the proper applica-
tion of Brady v. Maryland,77 which requires that prosecutors disclose to
defense counsel evidence tending to exonerate a criminal defendant.
According to the Thompson majority, “Failure to train prosecutors in their
Brady obligations does not fall within the narrow range” of cases where Sec-
72 Mark Walsh, A Real-Life Grisham Story: Denial of Jury Award Marks Disappointing
Postscript to Death Row Release, A.B.A. J., June 2011, at 19–20. In what some might con-
sider poetic justice, prosecutor Deegan was afflicted with a terminal illness. After this diag-
nosis, apparently wishing to clear his conscience, Deegan confided to a friend his
suppression of the evidence in Thompson’s armed robbery case. But in spite of his impend-
ing death, Deegan refused to disclose his wrongdoing and its impact on Thompson. Shock-
ingly, neither Deegan’s confidant nor any other attorney in the DA’s office came clean about
the withheld evidence and what some might regard as the frame-up of Thompson. If Thomp-
son’s own investigator had not discovered the truth, Thompson would have been wrongfully
executed. See also Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at n.1.
73 See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1356, Walsh, supra note 72, at 20.
74 See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1357–58, Walsh, supra note 72, at 20.
75 See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1365–66, Walsh, supra note 72, at 20.
76 See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1358–61.
77 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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tion 1983 liability can arise from a single Brady violation causing injury to a
defendant.78 Amazingly, a significant part of the majority’s justification for
waiving off the problems created by a DA’s office that failed to train its law-
yers adequately about one of the most important rules of criminal procedure
was the fact that lawyers come to the DA’s office with legal training, including
training in rules of professional conduct which they are obligated to follow.
Attorneys are trained in the law and equipped with the tools to interpret and
apply legal principles, understand constitutional limits, and exercise legal judgment.
Before they may enter the profession and receive a law license, all attorneys must
graduate from law school or pass a substantive examination; attorneys in the vast
majority of jurisdictions must do both. These threshold requirements are designed to
ensure that all new attorneys have learned how to find, understand, and apply legal
rules.
Nor does professional training end at graduation. Most jurisdictions require
attorneys to satisfy continuing-education requirements. Even those few jurisdictions
that do not impose mandatory continuing-education requirements mandate that attor-
neys represent their clients competently and encourage attorneys to engage in contin-
uing study and education. . . .
Attorneys who practice with other attorneys, such as in district attorney’s
offices, also train on the job as they learn from more experienced attorneys. For
instance, here in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, junior prosecutors
were trained by senior prosecutors who supervised them as they worked together to
prepare cases for trial, and trial chiefs oversaw the preparation of the cases. Senior
attorneys also circulated court decisions and instructional memoranda to keep the
prosecutors abreast of relevant legal developments.
In addition, attorneys in all jurisdictions just satisfy character and fitness stan-
dards to receive a law license and are personally subject to an ethical regime
designed to reinforce the profession’s standards. Trial lawyers have a ‘duty to bring
to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing
process.’ Prosecutors have a special ‘duty to seek justice, not merely to convict.
Among prosecutors’ unique ethical obligations is the duty to produce Brady evidence
to the defense. An attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is subject to
professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment.
In light of this regime of legal training and professional responsibility, recurring
constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious consequence’ of failing to provide pros-
ecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey the law. Prosecutors are not
only equipped but are also ethically bound to know what Brady entails and to per-
form legal research when they are uncertain. A district attorney is entitled to rely on
prosecutors’ professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of specific
reason, such as a pattern of violations, to believe that those tools are insufficient to
prevent future constitutional violations . . . .79
The Thompson majority’s “ode to attorney training and professionalism”
coupled with the same group’s failure to even nod to Richard Ceballos status as
a lawyer in Garcetti is nothing short of amazing. Where it serves the majority’s
purpose of finding no liability for a DA, lawyer professionalism is front-and-
center to its analysis. But when lawyer professionalism strengthens the case for
78 See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.
79 Id. at 1361–63 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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liability of a DA, the Garcetti/Thompson majority has no time for questions of
lawyer role.80
The particular application of this inconsistency is embarrassing when
applied to the facts of the two cases. Garcetti stands for the proposition that
where a lawyer takes his job seriously, including its command that he act as an
officer of the court, he buys a ticket to discipline or dismissal. But when a
group of lawyers in the DA’s office (one particularly egregiously) violates the
rules of professional conduct and ironclad, well-known constitutional law, the
lawyer’s fractured “professionalism” insulates the DA from liability. A visitor
from another planet would undoubtedly be surprised that legal professionalism
can be such a heads-the-government-wins, tails-the-employee-or-defendant-
loses proposition.81
Perhaps the most supportive thing to be said for the Thompson majority
decision is that the violation of Mr. Thompson’s Brady rights by deputy DA
Deegan and others was so egregious that one does wonder why specific training
in Brady should have been necessary—or whether it would have done any
good for the likes of Deegan and the other prosecutors in Orleans Parish who
managed to keep quiet about this railroading of a criminal defendant.82
Although questions of lawyer professional responsibility can be complex
in many cases, a huge number of legal ethics questions are answered by the
simple rubric that a lawyer should not lie, cheat or steal. Attorney Deegan did
all three. Failing to disclose exculpatory Brady material was clearly cheating.
He effectively stole the blood sample evidence from safekeeping by hiding it so
that it would not be found by Thompson. He constructively lied to Thompson
and the court by continuing to prosecute the case knowing of this evidence that
he had spirited away from the prosecution’s evidence file in Thompson’s case.
It was despicable attorney conduct, conduct that not even his impending death
prompted him to fully rectify—if it could be fully rectified at all once Thomp-
son was wrongfully subjected to the harms of incarceration.
Thompson clearly seems a bad decision, as well-articulated by the four
dissenting Justices. But at least Thompson addressed the issue of attorney pro-
fessionalism while Garcetti ignored it.83 Ironically, neither the Thompson
80 And it was the “same” majority in both cases. In Garcetti, Justice Kennedy wrote the
opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito (the dissenters were Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 412 (2006).
In Thompson, Justice Thomas wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Rob-
erts, and Alito (the dissenters were Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan). See
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
81 Like Garcetti, Thompson was widely criticized in the media. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note
72, at 19–20; Editorial, Failure of Empathy and Justice, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2011, at A26.
82 Perhaps the policy of the New Orleans DA’s office that deserved challenge was not fail-
ure to establish sufficient training about Brady v. Maryland but creation of a culture in which
deputy prosecutors so easily disregarded the ethical rules they were supposed to be bringing
to the job and which (in the view of the Thompson majority) insulated the department from
Section 1983 liability. The latter type of informal policy of overzealous commitment to con-
viction rather than procedural fairness is much harder to prove than the simple absence of a
Brady training program.
83 Although perhaps straining Section 1983 doctrine, a better theory of the case for plaintiff
Thompson might argue that the unconstitutional “policy” of the Orleans Parish DA’s office
was not so much its lack of more formal Brady training but its culture of seeking convictions
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majority nor the Thompson dissenters cite Garcetti. The Court fails to acknowl-
edge that the cases are of a piece.84 As noted above, the five-justice majority
that produced these poor opinions was self-servingly selective in their invoca-
tion of attorney professionalism. When it can be a shield for powerful govern-
ment defendants, attorney professionalism is emphasized. When it supports the
less powerful attorney-dissident, attorney professionalism is ignored.
The legal realist common thread running through these two cases is almost
subservient deference to authority and protection of authority from even awful
consequences of its misuse, even when the actions of the powerful run counter
to the professed norms of the justice system.
As bad as Thompson may be, Garcetti stands as a particularly bad deci-
sion not only for its failings of doctrine, logic, and public policy but because of
what it reveals about the Court, particularly five justices of the Court.
One can reasonably debate whether a supervising attorney or government
agency should be constitutionally liable for this type of misconduct by an attor-
ney-employee in the absence of evidence of repeated problems. One might also
reasonably debate whether constitutionalization of the job complaints of a gov-
ernment employee is wise. But whatever the merits of the constitutional law
debate, it should be conducted with full appreciation and open acknowledge-
ment that the conduct at issue was that of attorneys, officers with professional
obligations different from those of the ordinary lay employee. Garcetti’s failure
to address these issues makes it even worse than Thompson as a matter of
judicial craft even though Mr. Thompson suffered considerably more than did
Attorney Ceballos.
The Garcetti (and Thompson) majority is particularly blameworthy in that
it appears to regard its mission as enhancement of the establishment and protec-
tion of the powerful. Critics, even those basing criticism on professional obliga-
without regard to constitutional requirements and concern for fairness to the defendant as
well as what seems to be a culture of failing to speak out when a colleague commits constitu-
tional infractions. A closer examination of the culture of the DA’s office might well reveal
sufficient evidence of these attitudes to qualify as a policy, pattern, or practice sufficient to
subject the DA to Section 1983 liability on the ground that the misconduct of Deegan and his
colleagues cannot be considered isolated, episodic, or unexpected by the DA.
84 In perhaps bitter irony, one finds references in the Garcetti oral argument to a prosecu-
tor’s Brady v. Maryland obligations that were at issue in Thompson and a disturbing ten-
dency of the government to regard the rights of supervisors as superior to those of a criminal
defendant entitled to Brady material. See Transcript A, supra note 26, at 17 (statement of
Garcetti counsel in response to question of Justice Souter) (“Brady disclosures are the obli-
gations of the district attorney’s office. So, in this case, when the deputy district attorney
believed that it should be disclosed, his supervisor had an absolute right to, say, on behalf of
the DA’s office, challenge that decision to disclose.”); Transcript B, supra note 26, at 9–10
(statement of Garcetti counsel in response to question by Justice Ginsburg) (“If the boss
makes a determination that ‘This is not Brady materials. I don’t want disclosed,’ and the
employee goes ahead and discloses it, our position is, that would not be protected First
Amendment speech.”).
A Court more sensitive to the professional obligations of even lower ranked lawyers in
a government office would have stomped out this bit of government hubris rather than indi-
rectly blessing it in Connick v. Thompson. The attitude of Garcetti counsel toward Brady
obligations had a certain “I am the law” tone reminiscent of totalitarian dictatorships rather
than the lawyer professionalism we traditionally associate with American democracy. Those
chickens came home to roost five years later in Thompson.
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tions, are not to be suffered while the controlling elite is given the widest of
unquestioned latitude to ensure that employees tow whatever party line desired
by those in control.
Even for the dissenting justices in (save for Justice Breyer in Garcetti),
their self-imposed role appears to be one of constitutional law technician with
little or no appreciation of the importance of their profession and its norms “on
the ground” of adjudication. In particular, the notion of lawyers as honest bro-
kers who act as officers of the court and guardians of justice—even when it is
not in the interests of their career advancement—seems to have been accorded
little significance by any member of the Court other than Justice Breyer. Law-
yers in the eyes of the Court, while perhaps rising above the level of potted
plants, are not treated as professionals with duties to the justice system
(Garcetti). But because lawyers have technical training, the government offices
in which they work are permitted—through the efforts of several lawyers—to
essentially frame a criminal defendant but suffer no consequences (Thompson).
Because it is so demoralizing a picture of the Court’s approach to its own
profession, Garcetti stands out as a particularly bad decision. As noted at the
outset of this Symposium, cases making the “worst” list need not necessarily
implicate grave wrongs in the nature of Dred Scott or Plessy v. Ferguson. As
noted above, Richard Ceballos remains a deputy DA and seems to have recov-
ered well from the alleged retaliation suffered, which although condemnable
fell short of firing or the grave physical or mental abuse visited on some tort
victims or incarcerated defendants. But regardless of the degree of harm suf-
fered by Ceballos, his case reflects the Court in a most disappointing light.85
For those of us who wish the bench would appreciate the higher calling of
lawyers rather than simply reflecting sympathy for lawyer-defendants (and
government defendants generally), Garcetti earns a place as one of the modern
Court’s “worst” decisions notwithstanding that there may generally be legiti-
mate concerns about how far to extend the Constitution into workplace person-
nel matters. The decision reflects a Court lacking in both professional
consciousness and professional conscience, one that prefers its lawyers to be
potted plants when faced with prosecutor miscues but is only too happy to
immunize supervising attorneys and department heads when they are accused
of failing to uphold professional standards.
85 Garcetti is depressing as well in that although the Court largely missed the professional-
ism implications of the decision, its problematic First Amendment holding was a near-miss.
The case was originally argued when Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was on the Court. After
her resignation and replacement by former Third Circuit Judge Samuel Alito, the case was
reargued, with Alito providing the crucial fifth vote for the Garcetti majority (and eventually
the Thompson majority as well). See David L. Hudson Jr., Free Speech Case Points Up
Change in Court, 5 ABA JOURNAL EREPORT 22 (June 2, 2006); Nina Totenberg, All Things
Considered: High Court Tightens Rule on Workplace Speech (National Public Radio broad-
cast May 30, 2006). Totenberg, a veteran reporter with extensive Supreme Court contacts,
noted that the Souter dissent “had all the earmarks of what may once have been a majority
opinion” that became the dissent when Alito replaced O’Connor, a view echoed during the
broadcast by Georgetown Law Professor Martin Lederman. Id.
